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LIMITATION ON DEATH ACTION




It has long been the settled rule, both in this country and in
England, that the judiciary may not independentlyhearanaction
for wrongful death.1 Whatever the reasons for the rule
(there seems to be some doubt as to whether there are any
reasons), it may be abrogated only by statute. 2
The first such abrogation was the passage of the Fatal
Accidents Act (Lord Campbell's Act) in England, in 1846.3
Subsequently, every state in the United States has enacted some
type of wrongful death statute 4-Virginia's statute, patterned
after Lord Campbell's Act, was enacted in 1871.
Unfortunately, many state legislatures, including the
legislature of Virginia, were not content merely to abolish the
old rule, but rather found it necessary to place certain special
limitations on death actions. 6 From the beginning, one
of these limitations-a maximum limitation on damages
recoverable-has been a feature of the Virginia statute. 7 This
inquiry is an attempt to evaluate the theoretical validity and
practical value of this limitation within the framework of the
Virginia statute.
At the outset, it is significant to note that Lord Campbell's
Act, the prototype of the Virginia statute, has never had a
I PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d Ed. 1955) The rule is said to be founded on the
ancient maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. It was first enunciated in the
case of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp 493; 10 R. R. 734 (1808). See generally,
Holdsworth The Origin Of The Rule In Baker v. Bolton.
2 See POLLOCK, TORTS pp. 52-56 (ist Ed. 1887); Smedley, WrongfulDeath-
Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 605.
3 Star. 9, 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
4 Op. Cit. Supra Note 1.
5 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633-640 (1950).
6 "Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the
law ... It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process ... were to
perpetuate the very evils to be remedied." Van Beech v. Sabine Towing Co.,
300 U. S. 342, 350 (1936).
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (1950).
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maximum limitation on damages. 8 Today, we may only con-
jecture on the reasons which prompted the Virginia legislature
to incorporate such a curious feature into its statute. In modern
times, two reasons are advanced in support of a maximum
limitation on recovery in death actions: (1) that the uncer-
tainty of damages arising out of the death of a person requires
that the jury be limited in their verdict, and (2) that a jury is
prone to render an excessive verdict in death actions due to the
strong feelings of sympathy aroused in such cases.
Uncertainty of Damages
The premise of the argument itself deserves consideration.
It is more difficult to arrive at damages in death actions o than
in certain other personal injury actions? At least in regard to
compensatory damages it would seem that the answer must be
"no". For example, in the case of a personal injury resulting in
permanent (or "possible" permanent) disability, the jury is
faced with virtually the same questions in regard to damages
that are raised in a death action. These are: (1) what is the
life expectancy of the plaintiff, and (2) what are the plaintiff's
probable future earnings? The one consideration that is
necessary in a death action, but not necessary in an action for a
disabling injury, is the statutory beneficiaries interest in the
income of the deceased.1 o While this question admittedly
presents some difficulty it is hardly as perplexing as the multi-
tude of problems peculiar to the case of a disabling personal
injury, as follows: (1) What are the probable future medical
expenses of the plaintiff? (2) To what extent will his future
income production be impaired? (3) What are the possibilities
of a future recovery? (4) If future recovery is possible, what is
the probable date and extent of same? (5) What is the pos-
sibility that the injuries sustained may result in a shortened life
8 Stat. 9, 10 Vict. c. 93 § 11 (1846).
9 The term "death action" is not used in its technical sense. Strictly speaking, a
death action is one brought under a Lord Campbell type statute in which there
is a new cause of action in favor of the decedent's personal representative for
the benefit of certain designated persons. There are also survival statutes (to
be found in a minority of states) which are designed to preserve the cause of
action vested in the decedent at the moment of his death and enlarging it to
include the damages resulting from his death. Prosser, Torts § 105 p. 710
(2d Ed. 1955). Here the term death action is used to include both types of
statutes for purposes of convenience.
10 See generally Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E. 2d 171 (1955).
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span? With the advent of new medical techniques, these
questions become increasingly relevant. Thus, in many cases,
the death of the would-be plaintiff simplifies-rather than
complicates-the task of arriving at compensatory damages.
True enough, the illustration of a permanent disabling personal
injury covers only a small fraction of personal injury cases at the
bar, but it does demonstrate the fact that, in principle, there is
no reason to segregate death action damages from other types
of personal injury damages, thereby justifying special treatment.
An example in another area of torts might be the difficulty of
measuring compensatory damages in libel actions.
There certainly can be no logical separation insofar as
punitive damages are concerned. Whatever the type of tort
action involved, the question is not the injury to the plaintiff,
but rather the culpability of the defendant.
The only remaining issue of damages under the Virginia
statute is that of "solarium". 11 Solatium may be defined as
compensation for the injury done to the feelings of a person, or,
in other words, damages for mental anguish.12 Since damages
for mental anguish are a proper element of damages in ordinary
personal injury actions, the question is raised as to whether
these same damages possess some unique character in death
actions so as to make them more uncertain. The only possible
basis for distinction is that in a death action the mental anguish
is not that of the person physically injured. Indeed, it is
generally held that one may not recover for mental anguish
suffered as a result of a physical injury to another. 13 This rule
is based upon the premise that the defendant owes no duty to
the person suffering mental anguish. *.4 In death actions, how-
ever, the legislature has said that there is a duty, simply by
providing for recovery by the beneficiaries for mental suffering.
The real question is this: Does the fact that a person has
physical injuries make a determination of the extent of mental
1 Most wrongful death statutes do not provide for damages for solatium. Vir-
ginia's statute while not expressly authorizing such damages has been held
to include them. Mathews v. Warner, 70 Va. 570 (1877); Ratcliffe v. Mc-
Donald, 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918).
2 Black, Law Dictionary p. 1563 (4th Ed. 1951).
13 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Curry v. Journal
Pub. Co., 41 N. M. 318, 68 P. 2d 168 (1937).
14 See ibid.
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suffering more easily ascertainable? While the extent of physical
injuries may be a convenient yardstick to determine damages
for mental suffering, this approach is hardly realistic. 15 It
would be just as sensible to measure the mental anguish in a
death action by the relationship of the deceased to the bene-
ficiary. The simple fact is that each case must be decided on the
basis of the individuals involved and in no case is substantial
certainty possible, physical injuries or no.
For the moment, let us assume for the sake of analysis that
damages in a death action are more difficult to arrive at than
damages in an ordinary personal injury action. Is a maximum
limitation on damages the proper solution? Because damages
are uncertain, are they necessarily small? Obviously not! If
liability is found the limitation on damages is nothing short of
a presumption in favor of the wrongdoer.
The only conceivable line of reasoning in the uncertainty
of damages theory must be as follows: Since damages are
uncertain, the jury may award damages in excess of the defend-
ant's true liability. If a maximum limitation is placed on
damages, it would prevent the jury from straying too far afield.
Thus the detrimental effects of the uncertainty as to the measure
of damages will at least be limited. However, if we are to accept
this argument, we must accept the logical corollary-that is
that the jury may also make an inadequate estimation as to
damages. Thus, a minimum limitation of damages would be
just as reasonable under this theory as a maximum limitation.
If it be said that the plaintiff is entitled only to the damages he
has proved, this is perfectly true. At the same time, the plaintiff
is entitled to the damages he does prove, and a maximum
limitation on damages may prevent him from receiving this.
In other words, the defendant's right not to pay damages
which have not been proved is no greater than the plaintiff's
right to receive damages which have been proved. The point is
that the idea of a minimum limitation on damages is no less
sound than that of a maximum limitation; and the idea of a
minimum limitation is, of course, absurd. An arbitrary limita-
tion on damages, bearing no relationship to the facts of any
individual case, does not tend to solve the problem of uncer-
tainty as to damages; rather, it ignores the problem.
15 Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943).
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Sympathy Damages
There can be no doubt that the sympathetic feelings of
jurors in death actions may be reflected in the size of the verdict.
It should be noted, in passing, that in certain personal injury
cases the plaintiff's injuries may be so grievous that the
sympathy aroused would be equal to that in a death action. 1
There are, after all, some things worse than death; yet no one
suggests a maximum limitation on damages in such cases.
More significant, however, is the fact that a maximum limita-
tion on damages represents an unintelligent approach to the
sympathy damages problem. In one case, the limitation may
curtail sympathy damages, but, in another, it may only serve
to reduce the true damages, and, in still another, it may not
reduce sympathy damages at all. For example, if the true
damages should be one hundred thousand dollars, the principle
effect of the limitation is to eliminate sixty-five thousand dol-
lars from a just verdict. True enough, there are no sympathy
damages in this verdict, but this solution is similar to cutting
off your head to prevent headaches. On the other hand, if the
true damages are only five thousand dollars the jury may award
thirty thousand dollars worth of sympathy damages and the
maximum limitation is of little or no value.
The Maximum Limitations as Applied in the Virginia Statute
In any case, the sympathy damages theory could hardly be
used as an argument for a maximum limitation on damages
under the Virginia death statute. The Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has all but sanctioned such damages under the pres-
ent statute. It was laid down in the earliest Virginia cases on
the subject that the definition of damages under the Virginia
statute should be given a liberal interpretation. 17 The words of
the statute are, "The jury in any such action may award such
16 It would seem that there is little basis for the view that death actions are par-
ticularly susceptible to sympathy verdicts-or excessive verdicts alone for that
matter. For example, of the 107 personal injury and death verdicts given in
New York State Courts over the last 15 years in excess of 10o,ooo dollars only
37 were death actions (New York has no limitation on damages). Most of the
personal injuries involved either paralysis or amputation of limbs. Thus death
actions accounted for 35.5% of the 100,000 dollars plus verdicts. It is signif-
icant to note that of the 166 verdicts in the 25,000 dollars to 100,000 dollars
range, 60 death actions were involved or 36.1%. Abstracted from Belli,
Modern Trials, Vol. 4, p. 708-758 (1st Ed. 1955).
17 Gough v. Shaner, supra Note 10.
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damages as it may seem fair and just, not exceeding thirty-five
thousand dollars ... "' Note that the "fair and just" test is
directly applied by the jury. It is accordingly held that the jury
is limited only to those damages which it considers "fair and
just" and that any other limiting instruction is not permis-
sible.1 9 It is difficult to see how the jury could be given a freer
hand in the matter. In the leading Virginia case on the subject
of damages under the Death by Wrongful Act Statute, Mat-
thews v. Warner's Administrator,2o the court made the following
observation:
It was argued very earnestly by the learned counsel for
the appellant that such a construction of the statute ["fair
and just" as the sole measure of damages] as we have here
given would result in great injustice, if juries are to be
turned loose to assess damages according to their own
notions, as to the compensation for the mental sufferings
and agony of a mother losing her child, or of a wife losing
her husband, unrestrained by statutory enactment confining
them to the actual pecuniary injury resulting from death.
There are two answers to such arguments-one is ita est
scripta lex. The other is-we must presume the legislature
knew the force and effect of their own enactments. They
must, with such knowledge, have known the force and effect
of the language they used. It may be they intended, as they
must have intended to make no distinction in a case where
a man of full vigor, devoting his whole life and service to
the support of his family, was killed by wrongful act,
negligence or default, and an aged man or woman, or a
child or cripple who was utterly dependent, whose death is
caused in the same way. In either case, as the law is written,
the person or corporation by whose wrongful act, default
or negligence the death is caused, is liable in damages, and
in such damages "as to the jury may seem fair and just".
But if the law as it is written is unjust and oppressive and
contrary to the laws of most of the other states of the union,
it is for the legislature to change the law. 21
18 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (1950).
19 Wolfv. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E. 2d 654 (1953); Gough v. Shaner, supra
Note 10.
20 Matthews v. Warner, 29 Gratt (70 Va.) 570 (1877).
21 Id. at 577, 578.
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Virginia is thus placed in the peculiar position of being one of
the few states which has a maximum limitation on damages
and, at the same time, is one of the most liberal in awarding
damages. 2 2
As if this contradiction were not enough, the Virginia
statute also has been held to mean that the jury's assessment of
damages is final, and neither the Supreme Court of Appeals
nor the trial court has the power to disturb it. In Harris v.
Royer,23 the court said:
Our decisions go to the effect that the jury, in such cases,
[death actions] is under the statute giving the action abso-
lutely [sic] the judge of the amount of damages, and its
findings cannot be disturbed unless the court can see that
the jury was actuated by passion, prejudice, or corruption
•.. There is no appearance of passion, prejudice, or cor-
ruption on the part of the jury unless we can assert the pres-
ence thereof from the mere amount of the verdict. No
evidence of passion, prejudice, or corruption is given. We
cannot assume their presence. 4
In other words, no matter how ridiculous the size of the verdict
is, direct evidence of passion, prejudice, or corruption is
necessary to have the verdict set aside. Thus, in a case in which
the true damages should be nominal, the jury may bring in a
verdict for thirty-five thousand dollars, and that verdict could
not be disturbed. This presents an interesting situation. We
cannot assume passion from the size of the verdict in order to
set it aside, but, at the same time, we maintain a maximum
limitation on damages which assumes that true damages can
only be thirty-five thousand dollars, or less, in any case.
Can it be less than obvious that a sensible method of
keeping damages reasonable would include clear and definite
instructions to the jury on proper elements of damages (not
just a vague "fair and just" test), combined with the power of
the trial judge and the Supreme Court of Appeals to set aside
a clearly unjust award? There can be no comparison between
22 25 C.J.S. Death § 107 (1941).
23 165 Va. 461, 182 S.E. 276 (1935).
24 Id. at 468, 182 S.E. at 283.
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this method (which, after all, is not exactly radical) and the
present method involving an arbitrary standard bearing no
relationship to the circumstances of any particular case. If we
assume that the jury will be plagued by uncertainty and passion
in a death action, then there is all the more justification for
invoking the traditional safeguards which guide and check the
juries' judgment.
Conclusion
It is impossible, of course, to make the determination of
damages in death actions completely simple or completely just.
At least, however, nothing should be done affirmatively to make
the task more difficult or more unjust. Maintaining a maximum
limitation on damages is just such an affirmative act. If the
Virginia Legislature were to remove the maximum limitation
on damages from its death statute, it would not be the first
state to have effected such a removal. In 1893, there were
twenty-six states with maximum limitations on damages in
their death statutes. 2 -5  Today, there are only thirteen states
with such limitations.26 It is significant to note that during
this seventy-year period not a single state adopted the maximum
limitation. The workings of the maximum limitation in practice
are apparently not very impressive to other states. In the
already famous case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,27 the
25 Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
26 The states, statutes, and maximum limitations are as follows:
State Statute Maximum Limitation
Colorado §41-1-3 $25,000
Illinois §70-1-2 $30,000
Kansas §§60-3203, 3204 $25,000
Maine ch. 165, §§9, 10; ch. 188 $20,000
Massachusetts ch. 238 $20,000
Minnesota §573.02 $25,000
Missouri §537.090 $25,000
New Hampshire ch. 556, §§ 11-13; ch. 91 $25,000
Oregon §§30.020, 121.020 $20,000
South Dakota §37.22 $20.000
Virginia §8-633-640 $30,000
West Virginia ch. 55, Art. 7 § 6 $20,000
Wisconsin §331-03-04 $22,500
38 Dicta 237, 238 n. 17 (1961).
27 9 N. Y. 2d 34, 172 N. E. 2d 526.
LIMITATION ON DEATH ACTION
New York court expressed its opinion of a maximum limitation
on damages in the following manner:
Our courts should if possible provide protection for
our own State's people against unfair and anachronistic
treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters
[airplane crashes in other states which have a maximum
limitation on damages]. New York's original Wrongful
Death law.., had no restriction as to damages. The
legislature later imposed such limits but the Convention
which drew the 1894 Constitution rejected and forbade
them. "The argument which evidently controlled the con-
vention in its action consisted of the claim that the
arbitrary limitation was absurd and unjust, in measuring the
pecuniary value of all lives to the next of kin, by some
arbitrary standard". The absurdity and injustice have
become increasingly apparent in the six decades that have
followed."8
The maximum limitation on damages under the Virginia
Death by Wrongful Act Statute has no foundation in logic; it
is not just, and it has been found to be undesirable in practice.
It is one anachronism which the State of Virginia can afford to
do without.
28 Id. at 35, 36, 172 N. E. 2d at 527, 528.
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